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Rationality Revisited 
From Human Growth to Productive Power 
Kimmo Lapintie 
THEME: TOOLS FOR INTER-
ACTION IN URBAN PLANNING 
W hether more theoretical or practical in their orienration, planning theorists do not seem to be able to avoid the basic philosophical and 
socio-political debates around rationality. Contemporary 
theories on communicative planning (e.g. Healey 1996, Sager 
1994, N y l u n d 1995) are based obviously on a critique o f i n -
strumental and strategic rationality o f synoptic and strategic 
planning, and they usually tely on some form of the Haber-
masian concept o f communicative rationality, yet they ate 
clearly interested i n developing new forms o f p lanning 
practice. Sticking to an outmoded conception o f rationality 
seems to these writets to prevent the development o f new 
tools for the reflective practitioner 
O n the other hand, the tevitalized intetest in the problems 
of powet relations in planning has opened anothet perspec-
tive i n the debate. Bent Flyvbjerg's critical analysis o f the 
history o f the Aalborg Project (Flyvbjerg 1998) was also meant 
as an introduct ion to an alternative theoretical perspective 
(as compared to the Enlightenment ttadition) informed by 
Machiavelli, Nietzsche and Foucault. A l though Flyvbjerg's 
study d i d not actually enter this theoretical debate, the 
contr ibut ion o f this alternative intellectual root is essential, 
however, and I assume that in the future, planning theory 
w i l l have to address the Foucaultian concepts o f powet/ 
knowledge and productive powet more seriously. 
There are, however, still teasons for a furthet sharpening 
o f rhe theoretical tools used i n the aforementioned app-
roaches. The purpose o f this papet is to examine a couple o f 
the problem zones that seem to have been mapped i n a too 
sketchy manner. Firstly, I shall argue that the transition from 
the instrumental rationality o f rational planning to its dialo-
gical alternatives is often given a too rough formulation. I n 
a sense, instrumental rationality is given up too easily, which 
also means that the real meaning o f its alternatives is not 
given due attention. Cottespondingly, when communicative 
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rationality is introduced, it is usually connected to the whole 
of Habermas's theory of communicative action. I f Habermas 
is swallowed in one piece, the heterogeneity of his work is 
not given enough attention. 
In contrast to Tore Sager, for instance, I shall suggest that 
the essence of rational planning is not the availability of 
perfect information and the relevant calculation capacity of 
the planning agency. The introduction of imperfect infor-
mation and risk by no means entails an irrational element 
in planning. On the contrary, the rational planner, as far as 
he or she is rational, must take the limited amount of know-
ledge and the limited capacity to process ir (including time!) 
into account. However, there are still serious theoretical 
problems connected with the rational planning paradigm — 
and subsequently addressed by the communicative planning 
theories. I shall demonstrate this by discussing the "human 
growth" rationale for planning introduced by Andreas Faludi, 
and used also in the communicative theory of Sager, as part 
of his "compound rationale" for planning. I shall suggest 
that this is based on the Cartesian philosophy of consciousness 
and the modern, Hegelian political philosophy of a conscious 
and self-guiding political community. 
Since this tradition has insufficient capacity to analyse 
the actual social relations determining the problems and 
potentials of planning, I shall suggesr that communicative 
theories should take a distance from this tradition, in order 
to address both the structural and the micro levels of power 
relations. I shall then discuss how the argumentative approach 
that I have suggested elsewhere (Lapintie 1998) and the 
perspective opened by Foucault's understanding of power 
could contribute to this debate (Foucault 2000). This requires 
an extension of the analysis put forward by Flyvbjerg (1998). 
In this article, I shall not fully explore the area opened by 
this perspective, but only point out its main directions. 
The basic motivating idea behind this article is that the 
development of planning practice, such as the introduction 
of new communicative tools for planners, is deeply connecred 
to the most puzzling problems of planning theory. Without 
entering into this theoretical field, our practical efforts will 
seem like fighting in the dark against an unknown enemy. 
Paradoxically, the practical orienration of planning research 
- our desire to reach for applications as soon as possible - is 
perhaps the reason why we so often seem to lose touch of 
what really goes on out there. 
A Critique of Synoptic Planning 
and Instrumental Reason 
In theoretical texts introducing different rationality concepts 
in planning, synoptic or rational-comprehensive planning 
is often used as an idealized type to distinguish it both from 
incrementalism and dialogical theories. One of the assump-
tions connected to this idealization is the idea that planners 
should have perfect information to be able to calculate the 
best possible action alternative in a given situation (Sager 
1998, 8). In other words, to use the means-end scheme, given 
certain ends, only by using perfect information and a perfect 
information processing capacity are planners able to calculate 
the best possible combination of means to reach the ends. 
This idealized exposition is a sort of straw man, however, 
since it does not correspond to the original theories of 
rational planning, such as those by Banfield and Meyerson 
(1955) or Faludi (1973). According to Banfield and Meyerson, 
perfect information can of course never be reached, but 
rationality can still be added to the process of deliberarion 
through additional knowledge of the consequences of alter-
native actions. This more moderate conception of rationality 
can still be seen behind contemporary practice of environ-
mental impact assessments. In his Planning Theory (Faludi 
1973,107), Faludi also clearly addressed this limitation, with-
out thereby rejecting his rationalistic approach to planning. 
Thus it seems to me somewhat beside the point to discuss 
rational planning in this transcendent form which, as Sager 
clearly demonstrates, even leads to logical inconsistencies 
(Sager 1998,125). 
Another assumption concerning synoptic planning is its 
devotion to given ends, without giving any intrinsic value 
to the means, in particular the planning process itself. Accor-
ding to Sager, this is even the very point distinguishing in-
strumental and communicative rationality in planning: 
In one way ot another, a purpose or a goal can be formulated 
for any action. The means-end scheme is invalid in commu-
nicative rationality not so much because goals are too unclear 
and ambiguous to inform action - which they often are. It is 
more to the crux of the matter that the ulterior end is em-
bedded in the activity itself. Dialogue, close ego-confirming 
relationships, and the experience of being able to make a 
difference when issues are discussed (democracy) are important 
to the development of mature personalities. Hence, they 
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have intrinsic value independent of any goal-otiented strategy. 
Potential advantages in tetms of goal achievement are by-
products. (Sager 1998, 7) 
I find this interpretation, which Sager ( in line w i t h Faludi) 
subsequently applies to planning (ibid. 38-45), problematic 
i n two respects. Firstly, although dialogue i n close inter-
personal relationships certainly is important for the deve-
lopment o f mature personalities, i t is strange to define such 
a rationale for public planning. Planning is and w i l l remain 
distant to most people, since i t is not part o f theit daily 
w o t k and personal relations. Whenever they enter into a 
planning process, they w i l l hardly expect a prolonged process 
that has the secret objective o f developing their personalities. 
Since plannets ate, moreover, hardly experts in adult edu-
cation, suggesting such an ulterior end to planning w o u l d 
represent an unjustified paternalism. 
Secondly, this interpretation is not enough to distinguish 
instrumental and communicative rationality. If, for the sake 
o f argument, we were justified i n raising human growth, 
which Faludi suggested as the ulterior end o f planning (and 
a balanced land-use and sustainability, for instance, as its 
by-products), then the plannet reasoning insttumental ly 
would naturally have to give priority to this end, and choose 
the means that wete most efficient in pursuing human growth. 
If, as Elster suggests (Sager's reference, ib id . p. 7), pursuing 
this end requires, for instance, that the planner withholds 
the information that this really is the ultimate end o f planning, 
then this is what he has to do. Contrary to what Saget assumes 
(Sager 1994/1998, 33-34) there is no need for the planner, i n 
this case, to step outside instrumental rationality. Or, i f one 
agrees w i t h Habetmas, he cannot step outside o f i t , since 
this type o f strategic use o f discourse clearly belongs to ac-
t ion otiented to success, which is dominated by instf umen-
tal teason. 
Individual and Collective Rationality 
Since the Faludian concept o f human growth, which is also 
behind Sager's idea o f developing mature personalities, 
seems to be so centtal i n dist inguishing between rational 
and communicative theories, we should perhaps pause here 
for a somewhat closer analysis. I w i l l try to demonstrate that 
this concept was - i n addition to dtawing on contemporary 
cybernetic theory - based on an important tradition i n pol i -
tical philosophy which was, actually, one o f the central oppo-
nents o f Habermas i n his theory o f communicative action. 
But i n order to avoid what might be conceived as a straw 
man, I shall go back to Faludi's original definition o f this 
concept. Referring to Diesing, Deutsch, and Etzioni, Faludi 
defined h u m a n growth as the increase i n the range and 
diversity o f goals that we are able o f following, and the growth 
of the learning capacity and creativity as the gaining o f insights 
into the existing order o f things and the ttansformation o f 
that order into a new one (pp. 40—41). He proposed to regard 
human growth as 
...an ideal in the sense of man firstly ttansforming his physical 
environmenr and urilizing its resources; and secondly shaping 
human institutions, thus including the social environment 
into the otbit of his control. Because growth in the lattet sense 
also means self-guidance, this concept incorporates a view of 
man as gaining mastety ovet himself by power of his faculty 
of reason. (Ibid.,p. 45) 
Fotgetting for a moment the obvious gtand narratives (of 
mastery over oneself, narure and progress) behind rhe text, we 
should notice how smoothly Faludi moves from the individual 
agent to the social and political level. Taken at face value, the 
expression even appears absurd, since although human growth 
at the individual level certainly means, among othet things, 
the development o f the mastery over oneself, or self-guidance, 
i t certainly does not mean "shaping human institutions, thus 
including the social environment into the otbit o f his control". 
W i t h o u t warning, thus, Faludi is suddenly talking about man 
in the absttact, as all men, or human culrure. A n d this is no 
exception: in fact i t is very difficult to find, in Faludi's book, 
discussion o f the analogy between the individual and the 
collective, although there is a lot o f discussion o f the ratio-
nalisation o f both. He does write that 
this book assumes that processes analogous to individual 
consciousness exist in society. They resulr in socieral self-
awareness which, much as individual consciousness, can be 
inferred from observations. (Ibid. p. 42) 
But no argument is given for the analogy, a l though the 
existence o f a "societal self-awareness", even a societal "self", 
can reasonably be questioned. 
I n a latet book (Faludi 1987,55), Faludi d id answet to the 
critique by Cooke directed against this analogy, based on 
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the complexity and conflicts in social organizations. Faludi 
pointed out that the analogy is acceptable, since 
conflicting ends are not specific to otganisations. Indivi-
duals have difficulties also in integrating their ends. So they, 
too, face 'political' issues. 
But this atgument is beside the point, which is the basic onto-
logy behind Faludi's thinking. I f he accepts the individualist 
ontology, according to which there are individual agents with 
consciousness, it is totally irrelevanr whether they have moti-
vation conflicts. Calling them "political" is unjustified, since 
the very issue of politics (how to deal with social conflicts and 
develop legitimate social organizations and decision making) 
is not ptesent here. Thus the basic assumption behind Faludi's 
theory, that there is something like a collective goal or a 
collective consciousness, remains unjustified. 
But one should perhaps not accuse Faludi for failing to 
distinguish between the individual and the collective, since 
this way of thinking has an imporranr cultural tradition. It 
goes as far back as Plato, who used the analogy in The 
Republic, and its more recent developments can be found in 
the Hegelian and Marxist traditions. According to this line 
of thinking, the freedom of the individual — unlike in the 
liberalisr tradirion - is based on self-masrery. The ethical di-
mension of the individual corresponds to the political di-
mension of the community; both represent freedom from 
natural insrincts and drives. 
However, it is easy to see how this intellectual tradition 
became a trap for Faludian planning theory. In his analysis of 
the role of politics and planning, Faludi referred to the fact that 
people often reacr strongly againsr planning proposals, which 
they cannot see serving their own ends (Ibid. p. 100). Instead of 
trying to specify what kind of people would react and what 
kind of interests ate concerned, Faludi immediately translared 
this problem inro the classical problem of the rational indivi-
dual, the so-called infinite regress of reasoning, according ro 
which even the rational individual has to accept some reasons 
as given, without requiring arguments for them. Faludi's sug-
gested solution to this other problem is to the point: although 
some assumptions have to be accepted provisionally as given, 
this does not mean that they would be sacrosanct or absolute. 
However, this solution does not help us in solving the 
original problem of conflicr, although this is what he sug-
gests: 
I suggest that the same holds true even where the subject is 
not an individual but a collectivity, or even a whole commu-
nity, making decisions. This amounts to saying that, from 
the point of view of decision making, political choice is that 
process by which a community agrees to make those assump-
tions tequired to underpin and supplement knowledge so as 
to arrive at decisions. (p. 102) 
Thus, the individualist metaphor in fact destroys the com-
municative question opened by the conflict situation: a poli-
tical decision (no matter how it is arrived at) simply becomes 
"community agreement". The whole problematic of politi-
cal decision making (including rhetoric, coalition forma-
tion, struggle, participation, exclusion, etc.) are reduced to 
the simple self-guidance of a community. 
Let us now return to Sager. Even if we could formulate a 
purpose or a goal for every action (as he suggests) and, conse-
quently, for the planning process itself, there are two problems 
that make the situation complicated enough to destroy the 
means-end scheme of rational planning. Firstly, formulated 
goals are not the only things that matter. The meaning of 
action, of personal relations, and of life itself is not ex-
hausted by setting them goals. The same applies for cities 
and their developmenr. 
The means that are chosen to reach given ends, of course, 
carry independent meanings, but so do the perspectives 
and experiences rejected or silenced. There is, in fact, no 
reason to assume that these unformulated meanings would 
automatically be less important than the formulated goals. 
One could even go as far as to claim that the formulation of 
projects with goals and means is a special and a heavily 
simplified action orienrarion, suirable perhaps for very 
simple planning projects. 
The second problem is that even i f goals could be for-
mulated for a community, they are always the result of a so-
cial and political process. Some individuals and groups are 
more successful in gerting their suggestions and definitions 
for 'common goals' accepted, and even i f the established 
goals were legitimate, marginalized goals and private inte-
rests do not simply disappear. They continue to be expressed 
and demand to be heard and taken into account in the sub-
sequent stages of the process. Instead of one set of goals we 
thus have a multiplicity of goals and expressed interests, 
many of which are inconsistent with each other. And in 
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addi t ion to that , we always have the silence o f the margi-
nalized groups. 
Communicative Action and Argumentation 
I t is imporrant to see that one o f the basic motivations behind 
Habermas's theory o f communicarive action was to provide 
an alternative to the Cat tesian philosophy o f consciousness 
that has dominated Western thought for centuties. One o f 
the cotollaties o f this philosophy is that the solitary thinker, 
solus ipse, is projected onto social groups and communities. 
Cartesianism is thus the epistemológica! counterpart o f 
Hegelian political philosophy. Thus we are accustomed to 
discourses whete communities "pursue certain ends" and 
"develop strategic consciousness." 
I f we rejecr rhe use o f these individualistic metaphots that 
seemed to be the key problems of rational planning rheories, 
rhat is, admit that social entities cannot really have inten-
tions or self-awareness, we w i l l have ro use communicative 
concepts to describe purposive social action. This is actually 
what Habetmas tried to do wi th his theory o f communicative 
action. However, also Habermas was heavily tied to the 
same continental tradit ion that pervaded Faludi's th inking. 
His idea o f communicative action as necessarily an action 
"oriented to reaching common understanding" is not so far 
from the Hegelian self-mastery o f rhe state. 
The feature o f Habermas's theoty that makes i t difficult 
to apply i n practical contexts like planning is its purism: 
Communicative action is defined in a way that makes i t 
impossible to combine i t w i t h insttumental or strategic ac-
t ion . I n order to use discourse for strategic purposes, accor-
ding to Habermas, one w i l l first have to cheat one's partnet 
into believing that the situation is putely communicative, 
that is, oriented only to reaching a common understanding. 
Lying, for instance, of seduction, are only possible i f rhe 
audience is first led to take the situation as such that t r u t h 
and sincerity prevail. Using Austin's terminology, Habermas 
denies rhe use o f illocurionary acts for perlocutionary pur-
poses in communicative action. (Habermas 1984, 294) 
This is what makes communicative action a very narrow 
rerm, although Habermas d id not aim to use i t only as an 
idealised reference point . I t is important to temembet that, 
for Habetmas, acts o f communication and communicative 
action should be kept apart: in order to use speech acts stra-
tegically, they first have to be disengaged from the context 
o f communicative action ( ib id . 295). Similatly, Habermas 
regarded as linguistically mediated strategic action those 
interactions in which at least one o f the participants wants 
w i t h his speech act to produce petlocutionary effects on his 
opposite number ( ib id . ) . Needless to say, planning could 
thus never become an instance o f communicative action, in 
Habermas' sense, since neatly all o f the patticipants usually 
have sttategic aims (such as attempts to petsuade others to 
accept or to reject a certain plan). 
I f one turns from Habermas to less demanding theories 
o f argumenration, the results become more promising. For 
instance, the ptagma dialectical theory o f the Amsterdam 
school (van Eemeren & Grootendotst 1992) is an attempt 
to combine the normative and the empirical dimensions o f 
rational argumentation. The result is a normarive definition 
o f rat ional discussion, or discussion aimed at resolving 
differences o f opinion (instead o f simply settling disputes). 
The notms o f rational discussion, which are based on the 
basic function o f this interaction, can o f course be breached 
i n actual interaction, which resuhs i n the classical fallacies. 
The important feature o f fallacies (such as the straw man, 
ot begging the question, or argumentum ad hominem) is that 
they are not necessarily l iteral fallacies, but they can be 
intentionally used for sttategic purposes. Thus, they may 
lead to ind iv idua l success, b u t they block the way for a 
common search for solutions. 
The difference between purely insttumental or strategic 
action (that is, action oriented to success) and argumenta-
t ion is that when the patticipants engage i n argumentation, 
they can no longer merely stick to the standpoint that they 
have adopted previously. They wi l l have to be ready to modify 
or even reject their own positions i f they cannot be defended 
in critical discussion. Thus argumentation differs from mere 
rhetoric or other forms o f strategic communication, where 
patticipants defend theit preconceived positions and private 
intetests by using whatever means that they find useful for 
this purpose. 
I n contrast to the Habermasian communicarive action, 
howevet, atgumentation does nor collapse i f one or more o f 
the participants uses the situation for strategic or perlocu-
tionaty purposes. O n the contrary: i t is perfectly acceptable 
to br ing private interests to the forum and see i f they can be 
generalised. For instance, the inhabitants o f a housing 
estate that is subject to compaction can defend rheir access 
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to natural green areas by claiming that such access is the basic 
righr of every citizen, or that this access is provided in other 
areas. Similarly, rhe Chamber of Industry and Commerce 
can defend rhe access to the city centre by car by claiming 
that the economic viability of the city is necessary for every 
citizen. The fact that in both cases the original motivation is 
'selfish' does not mean that the arguments are invalid; their 
validity is rather based on the acceptability of the suggested 
generalisations (for the application of pragma dialectics in 
planning, see Lapintie 1998). 
Settlements and Solutions1 
Since modern rheories of argumentation are rarely used in 
planning theory, their contribution to the debate on com-
municative planning and rationality deserves a somewhat 
closer look. Since communicative planning theory is a 
normative-practical theory (Healey 1997:68), it would thus 
seem to fit naturally into the tradition of argumentation 
theory that tries to combine empirical and normative elements 
in communication. However, spatial or land-use planning 
is also a communicative practice that differs from the mote 
paradigmatic cases referred ro in argumentation theory, such 
as legal proceedings or science. It is an instance of political 
or policy discourse and, consequently, strongly dominated 
by rhetorical communicarion. But this is not by itself an 
obstacle. Supposing that the concept of resolving differences 
of opinion (instead of merely settling rhe disputes or nego-
tiating between the parties with conflicting interests) is the 
dividing line between argumentation theory and rhetorics, 
then rhe communicative theory of planning as a normative 
theory should benefit from the theory of sound non-falla-
cious argumentation. This will make it possible to evaluate 
and criticize argumentation in planning, and even to prov-
ide the practising planner with a toolbox for making better 
arguments (Lapintie 1998. A tool analysing and assessing 
planning argumentation (AAA), based parrly on pragma-
dialectics, is developed in Lapintie 2001). 
However, since communicative planning theory is also a 
practical theory, this will not be sufficient. Suppose that, in 
spite of all the efforts to avoid fallacies and to take care of 
relevance in communication, no common solution is found, 
in the sense that the parties are nor ready to accept each other's 
arguments, or withdraw from their conflicting standpoints? 
This is usually resolved by lifting the problem from rhe 
public meeting to the official political or juridical level, or 
sometimes by letting an expert do the job alone. Resolving 
conflicts by resorting to authoritative planning will , how-
ever, mean the shipwreck of communicative planning. 
Another possibility is that a common solution is found, 
but this is not in every respect a good solution, because the 
'best' argument has not won, or it may not even have appeared 
in the discussion; for example, in a situation when severe 
environmental risks are creared due to an insufficient under-
standing of the environmenral impacts of development. 
Similarly, the least advantageous groups of the community 
(children and adolescents, the elderly, the unemployed, the 
mentally i l l , etc.) may have difficulties in getting their 
voices heard, since they do not or cannot participate in the 
planning process. Even i f they do, they have very different 
cultural capacities for producing sound arguments, and 
they are perhaps heard but not taken seriously enough. 
Traditionally, these difficulties have been dealt with 
through professionalism: the professional planner and po-
licy maker are supposed to act on behalf of those who are 
not present or able to defend themselves. They are also sup-
posed ro carry out the relevanr investigations in order to assess 
the environmental impacts, health hazards, etc. Actually, 
this is not always the case, but in any case it is the ideal of 
professionalism in planning. But how is this related to the 
idea of the communicative turn, according to which ratio-
nalist expertise is to be discredited, and local participation 
and consensus-formation should take over? Are we not facing 
the classical dilemma of the Aristotelian rhetorics: 
Even if we had the most accurate scientific investigation in 
use, it would be very difficult to get some of our audience 
convinced by arguing only on that basis. 
(Aristotle, Rhet. 11, 1355325) 
The communicative planning practise may thus be said to 
solve some problems of traditional planning (authoritarian 
governance, closed and insensitive expertise, the predom-
inance of certain private inrerests, etc.) at the price of creating 
new ones, which could be solved through responsible pro-
fessionalism. 
The actual situation is much more complex, however. 
One of the reasons for the growing interest in direct parti-
cipation in planning has to do with the general level of 
education, as well as the multiplicity of disciplines relevant 
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to planning. The communicative process i n planning is no 
longer ( i f i t ever was) one between a few experts (the planner, 
the architect, the engineet) and a number o f lay persons, 
the former explaining and the lattet accepting of protesting. 
Instead, the plannef is often dealing w i t h a numbef o f issues 
(such as ecology, ethics, economy, social life) o f which he 
does not have any specific expettise. He may or may not be 
backed by some special experts, but his role is in any case 
that o f combining and interpreting, and possibly negotiating 
and communicating, rather than providing some k i n d o f 
universal super-expertise. O n the othet hand, the 'stake-
holders' may today hold expertise in many fields far superior 
to rhat o f the plannet. 
Thus we end up w i t h a combination o f different types o f 
expertise, local knowledge and ignorance, as well as different 
levels o f professionalism and ethical concerns. W h a t is the 
role o f argumentation in this context? Evidently, the solu-
tion-centred view o f argumentation that is centtal i n much 
o f argumentation theory is useful here, albeit w i t h qualifi-
cations. I n planning, as well as in othet forms o f argumen-
rarion, it is essential to make the distinction between settle-
ment and solution, whete the former means simply any 
(peaceful and discursive) merhod of gerring r id o f differences 
o f opinion. Bur what, then, is a solution? 
A dispute is tesolved, according to pragma-dialectics, only 
i f the antagonist rettacts his doubts because he has been 
convinced by the other party's atgumentat ion, or i f the 
proponent withdtaws his standpoint because he has realised 
that his atgumentation cannot stand up to the other party's 
critique. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst thus conttast the 
resolution w i t h the usual ways o f getting t i d o f such con-
flicts, such as calling on an unbiased t h i t d party (a jury, an 
ombudsman, a judge, or a referee) or negotiating a compro-
mise solution (van Eemeren et. al. 1996, 277). The paradig-
matic case o f good argumentation they seem to have in m i n d 
is, obviously, scientific discoutse, where referees certainly have 
to be used, but the actual resolution o f scientific debates is 
supposed to be guaranteed only by free and open debate, 
whete fallacies should be avoided as m u c h as possible. 
There are no judges or juries in science. Let us call a solu-
t ion attived at in this way solution 1. 
Since this is an empirical criterion, the definition o f good 
atgumentation cannot, however, be that i t has succeeded in 
getting the antagonists to retract their doubts ot withdraw 
their conflicting standpoints. This may, o f coutse, happen 
for many reasons; for instance, out o f respect for a renowned 
scientific authority, or from an unconscious fear o f becoming 
unpopular, or for any other "unscientific" - though perhaps 
strategically rational - reason. Resolution, defined i n this 
way, is therefore not tantamount to t r u t h or rhe best policy 
decision, i f one wants to avoid the problematic consequences 
o f cognitive and motal relativism. But i f that is so, then one 
may wondet whethet there is such a great difference between 
settling and resolving differences o f opinion, alrhough van 
Eemeren and Grootendotst present i t as a demarcation line. 
I f we consider the solution to a mathematical problem, 
the criterion cannot be the adherence of the minds o f mathe-
maticians, nor the willingness o f critics to rettact their 
doubt, but i t must be a real solution, a proof. Conversely, 
the absence o f unanimity is no criterion for the failure o f 
the suggested solution, i f the proof is valid, and no one can 
find any mistake i n i t . Certainly no proofs can be expected 
i n planning, but is i t really not possible that something of 
this kind is also meant by the practitioners t ry ing to find 
solutions to social, political, ethical, ot planning problems, 
not simply unanimity, but the teal, or at least a good enough, 
solution? 
I n that case, van Eemeren's and Grootendorst's definition 
o f resolution is somewhat counter-intuitive. We might , o f 
coutse, understand this as the empirical element o f resolution 
{solution 1), and do the usual philosophical idealization trick 
to arrive at a more trustworthy solution {solution 2). Let us 
define solution 2 as the situation where rhe differences o f 
o p i n i o n w i l l be resolved at the second level i f the parties 
would i n their debate conform to all o f the rules o f critical 
discussion, for instance those specified by the pragma-dia-
lecrical theory (van Eemeren &C Grootendotst 1992,202-209). 
Thus, the above-mentioned examples about the uncritical 
scientific audience would not be examples o f critical discus-
sion, since fear and too great respect for authority should 
not affect the proceedings o f critical discussion. Solution 2 
is thus the solution that we w o u l d end up i f we followed the 
normative requirements o f argumentation i n out planning 
discussion. 
Could we go as far as assuming that solution 2 is i n fact 
true, or the best solution to a political ot social problem? 
This would be a much mote promising idea than the cognitive 
relativism l u t k i n g behind the thetorical or consttuctivist 
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conceptions of solution i (i.e. solution i as the only option). 
But this would not do, at least not without additional rules 
of critical discussion on top of the ten specified by van 
Eemeren and Grootendorsr. The problem is, namely, that 
these rules are meant to create the preconditions of free pre-
sentation, defence and challenge to standpoints, just like in 
the communicative theory of planning, if the parties wish to 
do so. There is no rule requiringthe antagonist to challenge a 
standpoint that is not warranred, or the protagonist to pre-
sent arguments i f nobody has cast doubt on the standpoint. 
Thus we may imagine a communicative situation where, for 
social or cultural reasons, no one wishes to create a contro-
versial situation. In a community like that, solution 2 will 
not necessarily represenr rhe truth or rhe best policy option. 
It is petfectly possible for such a community to end up, for 
instance, in a development that will cause disastrous environ-
mental consequences. A 'real' solution would thus represent 
a third type, say solution J. 
Although our original attempt to define the 'real' solu-
tion is still unanswered, rhis distinction between solutions i, 
2, and j , would perhaps help to clarify the somewhat vague 
conceptual scheme that theorists of communicative planning 
are putting forward. Consider the following description of 
Patsy Healey's "inclusionary approach" to argumentation 
in planning: 
The challenge for an inclusionary approach to strategic spatial 
planning is to experiment with, and test out, strategic ideas 
in initially tentative ways, to 'open out' possibilities for both 
evaluation and invention of better alternatives, before allowing 
a 'preferred' discourse to emerge, and 'crowd out' the alter-
native. (...) This suggests that a discursive process needs to 
be designed which explicitly explores different 'storylines' about 
possible actions and offers up different 'discursive keys' for 
critical attention, maintaining a critical attitude until there 
is broad support for a new strategic discourse. Having thus 
generated a knowledgeable consensus around a particular 
storyline, the task of consolidating the discourse and deve-
loping its implications can then proceed. The discourse com-
munity can be said by this time to have collaboratively chosen 
a strategy, over which they are then likely to have some sense 
of'ownership'. A new 'cultural community' has been formed 
around the strategy. (Healey 1997, 278-279) 
What kind of solution are we talking about here? Com-
municative or collaborative planning, according to Healey, 
would seem to consist of the following steps: (1) opening up 
the discourse in order to allow for different alternatives, 
meanings and visions to come forward, (2) closing it down 
again through a careful timing and consensus-formation, 
and (3) forming a new "cultural community" around the 
chosen strategy. The problem is, however, that the theory 
still does not address rhe two original quesrions that were 
mentioned earlier: (1) why would the participants finally 
give up their differences of opinion concerning, for instance, 
a planned motorway through a residential or natural area, 
and (2) even if they do, is this a guarantee for its being the 
'right' solution in any sense of the word? Since unanimity is 
not the basic social feature of a large community, and, as we 
saw, it does not produce trurh or even the best available so-
lution to our problems, then what kind of consensus-for-
mation are we talking about? A rhetorical success? Or is it at 
all possible to arrive at such a "cultural community" after a 
successful opening up of real alternatives? 
In its essence, Healey is describing a solution 1, since rhe 
participants are not forced to arrive at a specific decision, 
nor do they use an unbiased third party for arbitration. But 
it is not only that, since the organizer of the process, the 
'communicative planner', is supposed ro take care that all of 
the strategic ideas and possibilities are brought forward for 
evaluation, and that a "critical attitude is maintained until 
there is broad support for a new strategic discourse." There 
are, thus, many elements of critical discussion present in this 
descriprion, but they are mainly concentrated on the opening 
phase, by removing obstacles of free discussion. The con-
sensus-formation still remains a black box. 
In order ro arrive at a solution 2, the other resources of 
argumentation should be taken into use, in the sense that 
participants would learn ro challenge rhe relevant alter-
natives and defend their srandpoints with relevant argu-
ments, but also to develop a readiness to alter and even to 
reject their standpoints i f they cannot be defended. The 
strategy of communicative planning could thus be described 
as a turn from expert-oriented planning and solution! towards 
solution 2. Although this will not guarantee that the 'best' 
solution is reached, i f it even exists at all, this gives space 
and a relevant role for both the professional (who can produce 
arguments not only for his own views but also for those 
who are not present, or cannot defend their interests) and 
36 Nordisk Arkitekturforskning 2002:1 
the local activist (who can br ing forward the meanings and 
values that are woven into the life-world and the everyday 
speech and story-tell ing o f the inhabitants). As the case 
studies we have carried out i n a number o f research projects 
at Helsinki University ofTechnology demonsttate, however, 
planning argumentation is still fat away from this ideal. But 
n o t h i n g ptevents taking i t as a professional goal for the 
reflective ptactitioner. 
Rationality and Power 
The most imporrant c t i t ique against any k i n d o f argu-
mentative approach, be i t Habermasian, pragma-dialectic 
or whatever, is that atgumentation in pracrical contexts is 
i n principle not rational, but father based on the existing 
power telations. This means that arguments (which may 
seem like attempts to give rational reasons for action) ate in 
fact eithet weapons in a continuous power sttuggle ot even 
symbolic tools for dominat ion and exclusion. 
One o f the tecent critics o f the argumentative approach 
in planning is Bent Flyvbjetg, whose book Rationalitet og 
magt [Rationality and Power] from 1992 became a classic 
even before its translation into English. I t has been seen as 
exceptional and even revolutionary i n two senses: first as a 
tare example o f a comptehensive and painstaking analysis 
o f planning in a local political context and, secondly, as a 
theoretical antithesis to the Utopianism o f both the rational 
and the communicat ive approaches i n p lanning theory. 
Flyvbjerg's theoretical underpinnings are - at least this is 
what he claims - Machiavel l i , Nietzsche and Foucault, 
instead o f Plato, Kant o t Habetmas. H e sees democracy 
and rhe Enlightenment tradit ion as weak social powers in 
comparison to the rhetotical and raw use o f power by rhe 
traditional interest groups. Both o f these exptessed inten-
tions - the case study and the theotetical conrribution — are 
welcome in the curtent discourse o f planning rheory and 
practice. Unfortunately, however, Flyvbjerg's contr ibution 
is concenttated mainly on rhe first challenge, providing us 
w i t h a bri l l iant case study o f local politics around planning. 
I shall argue, however, that he does not in fact utilize the 
theoretical pet spectives opened up by the tradition of thought 
that he refers to. 
Flyvbjetg follows the story o f the ptize-winning "Aalborg 
Project" f rom an ambitious and comprehensive plan o f the 
late 1970s, intended to reduce private car use and promote 
public ttansportation, cycling and pedestrians in downtown 
Aa lbotg i n Denmark , i n t o a chopped d o w n and incon-
sistent collection o f individual measutes that finally turned 
against the original objectives. The final evaluation that he 
gives o f the project is ruthless: 
There is considetable evidence to indicate that Aalborg's 
overall siruarion would have been berrer had the Aalbotg 
Project not been implemented at all. (p. 224) 
This is because only the measutes promoting public ttans-
portat ion could be implemented, but the corresponding 
reducrion in private car use d i d not succeed. 
The political reality presented by Flyvbjerg's narrative is 
by no means unique to Aalbotg or any othet corresponding 
city for that matter Rather, i t represents the daily bread o f 
every planner work ing i n the field, and i t is a healthy re-
minder for students and scholars that the problems o f i m -
plementation are not only related to the slow pace by which 
finished plans become teality, but also to the fact that the 
political context is not understood as i t is, but is father con-
fused wi th what it 'should be'. In such a situation, the plannef 
w i l l , paraphtasing Machiavelli, "come to grief". Echoing the 
ideals o f fational planning, the key persons i n the Aalborg 
Project showed, in hindsight, even astonishing naivete: they 
believed in "the absolutely best plan" and supposed that i t 
w o u l d become implemented i f they only believed i n i t 
"hard enough." 
Flyvbjetg's spearhead, however, is directed at planning 
theory that backs this naivete: the idea o f common objec-
tives and an evaluation o f alternatives based on scientific 
documentation, and the communicative idea o f the force 
o f the better argument. I n contrast, Flyvbjerg emphasizes 
the force o f deliberate distortion o f documentation, behind-
the-scenes negotiations, undemocratic coalitions (such as 
the " t r iumvirate" between the Chambet o f Industry and 
Commerce, the local newspapet, and the Police Depart-
ment) , and the dominance o f rhetorical persuasion. The 
book is full o f radical expressions and quotations dealing 
w i t h rationality and powet, such as "power defines reality" 
and "the greater the powet, the less rationality". 
O n the othet hand, thete seems to be a certain unbalance 
between the theotetical and the empirical ambitions o f the 
book. I agree that the Nietzsche-Foucault strain o f social 
theory is sti l l insufficiently uti l ized i n p lanning theory, 
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particularly since it presents a genuine challenge to both 
the rationalist and the communicative approaches to plan-
ning. However, Flyvbjerg does not actually enter this debate. 
He does not even define his key concepts, namely 'ratio-
nality' and 'power', in a way that would make his construc-
tivist interpretations consistent. 
On the face of it, he seems to be suggesting that the 'real 
politics' of Aalborg (rhar is, what really happens around and 
to the Aalborg Project), defines both knowledge and ratio-
nality of urban planning in rhis case. In a sense, knowledge 
and rarionality are inseparable from power relations. Rea-
ding the case more closely, however, gives one the impres-
sion that behind this constructed rationality there must be 
some kind of 'supreme' or transcendent rationality, or else 
this rationality "could not have been yielded to power" in 
open confrontation. This 'morally supreme' rationality is 
located somewhere near the original Aalborg Project, perhaps 
wirh rhe exception of the large bus terminal in the middle 
of the town (which was interpreted as the symbolic monu-
ment to "Bus-Marius", the mayor). I f the project would 
have been implemented as a whole, it would not have had 
the negative consequences it finally had. 
But what kind of rationality was rhis? This is, I assume, a 
legitimate question in our post-Habermasian and post-
Foucauldian world, where 'rationality by itself makes hardly 
any sense. Certainly it was not strategic rationality, since 
the designers of the project were not even prepared to meet 
the most obvious and potentially dangerous opposition of 
car-free zoning policies everywhere, the Chambei of Industry 
and Commerce with their conservative political allies. Neither 
was it communicative rationality, since the planners did 
not see the point in construcring alrernarive solutions, nor 
did rhey consider what kinds of solutions would benefit the 
different stakeholders. They had absolutely no plan for 
communication, and no readiness to develop their ideas 
according to the communicative process. At most they can 
be understood as taking the whole city as an instrument in 
their own professional enterprise, that is, practising instru-
mental rationality in its narrowest sense. 
Similarly, one may ask in what sense the most important 
opponent of the Aalborg Project, the Chamber of Industry 
and Commerce, can be described as non-rational. It is an 
interest-organisation, and therefore it has the legitimate 
role of pursuing the interests of its members. In the "longue 
durée" of urban polirics in Aalborg, it also proved to be 
efficient: 
The winners (of the struggle over the Aalborg project) are 
the business community in downtown Aalborg, who, via their 
strategy of opposing measures to resttict cars combined with 
grudging acceptance of improvements for public transpor-
tation, pedestrians, and bicyclists, have seen their customer 
base substantially increased. (p. 224) 
I f this is not strategic rationality, then what is? 
This apparent inconsistency in the theoretical and empi-
rical inrentions of Flyvbjerg, however, by no means dimi-
nishes the value of his case study: rather, it shows how well-
done research work lends itself to theorerical interpre-
tations of various kinds. Even i f one would not agree wirh 
the constructivist or relativist position implicit in Flyvbjerg's 
conclusions, his observations do force the planner and the 
planning theorisr ro address some key issues not always given 
due attention. I shall only mention two of them. 
The first is the almost trivial fact that in addition to 
"common objectives" (whether they can be formulated or 
not) urban planning is always confronted with special inte-
rests and objectives. Planning is, thus, always a game of 
interests, and different projects, arguments and interpre-
tations can be used in a strategic way. Once you are in a 
game, you cannot simply pretend to be outside. As the 
Aalborg Project clearly demonstrates, poor strategy is simply 
poor planning, no matter how marvellous the original 
objecrives were. 
The second observation is equally imporrant. Throughout 
the project's life-time, its opponents were much more at 
home with both the traditional and the modern institu-
tions of communication, that is, building coalitions, using 
informal negotiations, and using the media. What is essential 
to notice is that communication in the modern society is an 
area that requires special skills and education - something 
that traditional planners seem to lack, at least according to 
Flyvbjerg's case study. Moreover, skills are not enough, since 
the political control of a single hegemonic arena - such as 
the local newspaper - can have dramatic effects on the pu-
blic image of a planning project. 
The merchants in downtown Aalborg found support 
from the newspaper by a systematic selection of arguments 
and metaphors, such as "a traffic-happy city". As the original 
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arguments by the Chambet o f Industry and Commerce (that 
most revenues to downtown businesses come from persons 
driving theif own cats) was shown clearly to be false when it 
was finally investigated, the local newspaper simply used a 
misleading headline regarding the survey: "Aalborg's Besr 
Customers Come D r i v i n g i n theif Cats." I n contrast, the 
initiators o f the project were much more reserved about using 
the media: Their "stroking sttategy" included a tefusal to 
comment on even the most obvious distortions o f informa-
t ion . This strategy failed, as i t finally turned our, and a much 
more clever strategy for using the media would have been 
needed. 
Thete is a certain cynicism behind Flyvbjerg's narrative, 
and his conclusions may sound discouraging ro more Uto-
pian-minded theotists and practitioners. However, this is 
at least partly due to the remnants o f the rationalist ideal o f 
planning, according to which politics always destroys what-
ever good planners may have i n m i n d . " I don't like politics, 
I really don'r," said one o f the key characrers in Flyvbjerg's 
stoty, echoing the feelings o f many planners, and perhaps 
even Flyvbjerg himself. I t seems that the time has come for 
planners to start becoming interested i n i t again, i f they 
ever want to be important agents i n the development o f 
modern cities. 
What would it mean i f we, as Flyvbjetg suggested, would 
teally take the theotetical challenge derived from the Machi-
avelli-Nietzsche-Foucault tradition seriously? As I suggested 
above, i t w o u l d no longer be possible to mainta in clear 
dichoromies between rationality/knowledge/expertise and 
power. Instead, we w i l l have to accept that powet is created 
and recreated though vatious local strategies and tactics, 
including those o f the planner (Foucault i978 /200o). Instead 
o f a struggle berween rarionaliry and power, the realm o f 
planning consists o f a multitude o f smallet and larger power 
srruggles, where the possible roles and agencies o f different 
actors are i n fact constituted. 
Conclusion 
The purpose o f this article has been to discuss necessaty 
revisions and extensions to the dominant paradigm o f com-
municative planning. For this purpose, I aimed to trace the 
key problem inherent in the rational planning tradition that 
communicative planning theorists have presented as their 
main opponent. According to the argument, this is the 
Carresian ideology o f consciousness, projected onto social 
communities and societies. Accotding to this view, societies 
can be said to have common objectives and strategies, created 
by common understanding and political decision making. 
I f this view is rejected, i f the 'k ing ' , the 'political body' is 
finally decapitated, we shall have to deal w i t h communi-
cative processes that never reach 'consensus' or 'general w i l l . ' 
Alrhough Habermas clearly sought to provide an alter-
native to the Cartesian view, his theory o f communicative 
action was, however still tied to this centuties-old ttadition, 
through his concept o f ' common understanding'. His theory 
can also be said to be too purist i n its attempt to exclude 
all kinds or instrumental and strategic t h i n k i n g from the 
concept o f communicative action. 
I n order to develop communication in planning practise, 
one should rather turn to less demanding theories o f argumen-
tation, such as the pragma-dialectical theory by van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst. This normative-empifical theoty w i l l 
help to construct a working model for the assessment and 
development o f planning argumentation. 
Howevet, as normative theories, theories o f argumenta-
t ion have very little to say about the local political situation 
pervading the practice o f land-use planning. I n his book 
Rationality and Power, Bent Flyvbjetg atgued for giving a 
more central position to the analysis o f power i n planning. 
Al though his plea was well justified, the theoretical i m p l i -
cations o f the Machiavelli-Nietzsche-Foucault ttadition wete, 
however, not fully exploited by h i m . Instead of a dichotomy 
berween rationality and power (where rationality is supposed 
to 'yield to power'), a more complex situation can be said to 
ptevail in planning. As one o f the expet t systems o f the modet n 
society, planning can be seen as consisting o f a mult i tude o f 
strategies and tactics, used by all actors in rhe process. I n a 
situation like this, the plannet should become mote awate 
o f his or her own role as the producer o f local power, instead 
o f tetreating to rational, artistic, or other types o f distancing 
professional strategies. 
Note 
I . An original version of this section was published in Paivanen 
& Lapintie (eds.) (1998). 
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